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ABSTRACT 
The European Union (EU) currently lacks a comprehensive agreement on where the EU 
will engage in crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP) framework. This thesis investigates the motives for why the European 
Union engages in military or civilian operations under the framework of CSDP. 
Predominant research suggests the three dominant factors motivating the EU to engage in 
CSDP are national interests of the Member States; the EU is a supranational institution 
seeking to balance against the U.S.; and national political parties dominate foreign policy 
of the Member States. These three dominant factors lead to the development of three 
hypotheses for why the EU engages in military operations under the framework of CSDP. 
The first hypothesis suggests the EU elects to undertake CSDP missions as a means of 
balancing against United States’ hegemony. The second hypothesis suggests the EU 
undertakes CSDP missions because of the national interest of the dominant nations, 
specifically, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The final hypothesis suggests 
that the national political parties and their political stances influence when the EU will 
engage in military or civilian operations under CSDP. These hypotheses are tested using 
three case studies to examine what the dominant factor is in CSDP mission selection. The 
three cases represent missions outside of Europe where there is significant risk for EU 
troops and, therefore, significant political risk for EU Member State politicians. The three 
CSDP missions used in the case study section are the EU mission EUFOR Artemis to 
Bunia the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUPOL Afghanistan and EUNAVFOR 
Somalia. After examining the three cases within the boundaries of the three hypotheses, 
this thesis concludes that the national interests of the dominant Member States are the 
most significant motive for CSDP mission selection. While the other two motives play a 
role in the decision-making process, they are not nearly as dominant as that of the 
Member States’ national interests.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The European Union’s (EU) progress toward integration as a supranational 
institution has been remarkable. Since the 1950s, the EU has achieved equilibrium in the 
integration of 27 Member States’ national interests, despite their different backgrounds, 
history, and culture. Specifically, in areas of low politics like economics, the 
environment, border permeability for EU citizens, and the monetary union, the 
integration process has been remarkable. However, the European Union still faces 
challenges to full integration in the area of security and defense. More specifically, EU 
Members are willing to integrate on the economic, environmental and regulatory level, 
but many adamantly oppose integration on the security and defense level. These Member 
States argue integration in this arena of high politics sacrifices inherent portions of state 
sovereignty, such as a state’s right to decide when to use force. Further, some of these 
Member States suggest that the role of security and defense, in Europe, should be 
fulfilled by NATO; therefore, any attempt by the European Union to integrate in this 
arena will challenge NATO and its role in the sustainment of peace in Europe. On the 
other hand, these same nations claim, quite vocally, the European Union should play a 
more dominant role in the international community. Moreover, that the European Union 
should be able to influence how the international community deals with threats, 
challenges, and crisis by offering a European instrument for crisis management.  
The challenge for the European Union then becomes how to integrate in the areas 
of security and defense without undermining the role of NATO and the sovereignty of its 
Member States. In order to achieve a European option for crisis management, the EU 
needs to speak with one voice in the international community, in the realm of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Taking these challenges into consideration, the 
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European Union, in 1999, established the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
to conduct autonomous crisis management missions.1  
The past 28 CSDP/ESDP missions are the result of deliberation and compromise 
among the EU Member States to reach an agreement on the scale and scope of each 
mission. By electing to engage in crisis management missions under CSDP, Member 
States had to agree on whether the mission would be civilian, military, or hybrid; how 
long would the mission would be supported; which countries would be the active 
participants; and which Member States would be responsible for leading the mission. 
This debate among Member States, to achieve an agreed-upon mission, begs the question: 
What are motivators for Member States to engage in crisis management missions under 
the framework of CSDP?  
Current research has attempted to address what the characteristics of CSDP are 
and the European Union’s motives behind its creation. However, the question of why the 
EU chooses to conduct CSDP missions is still open for debate. This thesis offers three 
hypotheses, in an attempt to analyze why the EU undertakes crisis management missions 
under the framework of CSDP. These hypotheses are then tested in three case studies of 
prior and current ESDP missions to ascertain which of the three hypotheses best captures 
the European Union’s motivation to conduct a CSDP mission.  
B.  BACKGROUND 
 According to some, CSDP represents another step on the path towards ever-
greater and deeper political integration in the EU. They claim that the events surrounding 
the end of the Cold War forced Europeans to reflect on their role in providing European 
security as well as their role in managing potential crises that may erupt in Europe. 
Specific examples of events causing Europeans to address crisis management and 
security head on were the 1991 Gulf War and conflict in the Balkans. The challenges in 
the Balkans and the First Gulf War showcased to the Europeans how reliant they were on 
the United States and NATO for military action and crisis management.  
                                                 
1 After the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in late 2009, ESDP is now Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP).  
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 In the first Gulf War, Europeans learned they could not effectively communicate 
amongst themselves without the aid of NATO and the United States. The conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia highlighted the fact that European forces were designed to repel a 
large-scale land invasion against the Soviets, but not to conduct policing or military 
actions in response of a developing crisis. The war in Kosovo forced Europeans to ask the 
question what if the Americans do not want to get involved in a conflict such as the one 
in the Balkans? Was this a job for NATO or was this a conflict the Europeans should 
resolve independently from the U.S. and NATO? The Kosovo War highlighted that 
without the United States the Europeans might not have been able to get the belligerents 
to the peace talks.  
 In 1998, the leaders of France and the United Kingdom declared that the inability 
of Europeans to address regional conflicts on European soil without the aid of the United 
States was unacceptable. More famously known as the Saint Malo Declaration France 
and the United Kingdom declare,  
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage…To this end, the Union must have the capability for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises…Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can 
react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and 
competitive European defense industry and technology.2   
This declaration paved the way for what would become the European Security and 
Defense Policy, which would later be agreed upon by the rest of the Member States at the 
Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999.3  
 In the same year, European leaders at the Helsinki Summit set the Helsinki 
Headline Goal 2003, which described the military capabilities required to fulfill the so 
                                                 
2 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Plagrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 34–35.  
3 Giovanni Grevi, ed., European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999–2009) 
(Conde-sur-Noireau: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 13. 
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called Petersberg Tasks.4 The next step in the evolution of ESDP was the signing of the 
Treaty of Nice, which officially integrated the Petersberg Tasks into the European 
Security and Defense Policy. This is significant because the Petersberg Tasks set the level 
of ambition for the EU Member States regarding autonomous crisis management. The 
Nice Treaty also established the ESDP bodies to deal with crisis management. In 2002, 
the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, established the strategic partnership between 
NATO and ESDP later called Berlin Plus. This development created the framework for 
the first EU crisis management mission under ESDP, the EU Police Mission to Bosnia 
Herzegovina, in early 2003.  
 Later in 2003, the EU produced its first European Security Strategy (ESS)—a 
strategy that spells out where the European Union’s values and interests lay, as well as 
what the EU perceives as the greatest threats to security. The ESS also discusses the need 
for both civilian and military capabilities, as well as the integration between the two 
capabilities, in order to address international threats to security. Further, it asserts the 
threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorists are not conquered solely by 
military might, but rather, that a multifaceted approach to these threats is the best means 
to manage the challenges they pose.  
 All of these efforts—the actions of the European Council (EC); the various 
treaties among the EU Members; the Helsinki Headline Goal; and even the drafting of the 
ESS—have fallen short of creating what could be called a European Union White Paper. 
This document would establish the criteria for the when the EU would respond to a 
developing crisis and, at the same time, would commit the Member States to certain 
actions once the European Union has decided to engage in crisis management. The lack 
of a White Paper means that the missions conducted by the European Union under the 
framework of CSDP are a patchwork of national capabilities without an overarching 
strategic objective. Instead, CSDP missions are driven by the preferences of individual 
Member States and characterized by limited mandates and resources. Therefore, as long 
                                                 
4 The Petersberg Tasks were given to the WEU in 1992 but were never operationalized. They include 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking. “Petersberg Tasks,” 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm. 
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as political motivation to abstain from the creation of a White Paper exists, we are likely 
to continue to see a series of ad hoc missions, under the flag of the European Union, in 
order to support European values and interests, but without an overall strategic vision. 
Furthermore, because there is no White Paper that defines the purpose behind foreign 
military missions, participation by the Member States will also be on an ad hoc basis. 
Different coalitions of states will come together during various military interventions. If 
Member States do not provide resources for an operation under CSDP the mission will 
fail to materialize. What then motivates Member States to participate in or even lead 
CSDP operations or as this thesis asks what are the dominant motives behind why EU 
engages in CSDP missions?  
C.  IMPORTANCE 
The relevance of why the EU is motivated to intervene under the framework of 
CSDP is rooted in what the mission selection tells us about European economic, political 
and security priorities. The missions are selected because they hold some political, 
economic or security interest for the European Union as a whole or for one of its Member 
States. Understanding where the European Union’s priorities lie will allow U.S. policy 
makers to understand when they may see support or resistance from the Europeans on 
U.S. policies and actions, as well as when the United States may see the Europeans act 
independently from NATO and the U.S. For example, in the case of Operation Atalanta, 
the Europeans are taking on the anti-piracy mission autonomously.5  The EU is 
conducting the mission with its own chain of command without support from NATO or 
the United States. This suggests there could be crises in the future where the United 
States or NATO may be asked to take action, but could defer to the European Union as an 
alternative security provider to resolve the crisis. This type of arrangement could serve to 
keep the United States out of missions where they lack robust capability, such as rule of 
law missions or civilian policing missions.    
                                                 
5 Operation Atalanta is the EU Naval Force Somalia mission operating in the Gulf of Aden and Indian 
Ocean. The mission supports four UNSC resolutions and is tasked with providing security to WFP 
chartered vessels as well as assisting merchant vessels that come under attack by pirates. Further 
explanation of the mission is provided in Chapter III.  
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Interpreting EU mission selection will also provide insight into when the United 
States may see military growth in the European Union. If one of the motivating factors 
for mission selection is domestic politics, there is the potential that political party 
interests, within a Member State, could be signaling the growth of European military 
strength. In other words, participation in CSDP missions may provide political parties, 
supported by the defense industry sector, a means to foster political support for 
maintaining or increasing force structures and capabilities. The growth of military 
strength in Europe has repercussions for NATO and U.S. policy towards the European 
Union. If EU military growth is large enough, U.S. hegemonic position in NATO could 
be challenged and the U.S. could lose political influence in Europe. Additionally, as the 
EU grows in capability and strength, U.S. politicians lose the position of arguing for 
support of NATO if the Europeans are capable of providing for their own defense.   
Lastly, understanding the European Union’s interests and intentions in mission 
selection allows policy makers and decision makers to anticipate when U.S. policies and 
EU policies are going to clash. This type of insight allows leaders to be proactive in 
settling potential policy clashes before they occur. Additionally, this insight serves to 
help formulate foreign policy, as well as military policy and strategy. 
D.  METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is composed of two parts. Part one reviews and summarizes the current 
literature and current arguments on the EU and the role of CSDP. Analysis of the 
literature and current arguments leads to the development of three hypotheses regarding 
why the EU engages in CSDP missions. The first hypothesis suggests that the EU is a 
supranational institution seeking to balance against United States’ hegemony and CSDP 
missions provide a vehicle for the EU to undermine U.S. influence in international 
relations. The second hypothesis suggests the national interests of the dominant Member 
States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, are the primary motives behind the 
EU’s CSDP mission selection. The final hypothesis suggests that the policy stances and 
ideological preferences of the national political parties in power dictate when a Member 
State will be inclined to engage in an ESDP mission.   
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Part two of this thesis uses three case studies to test the three hypotheses in order 
to determine which of the three factors is dominant in ESDP mission selection. The 
missions are, EUFOR Artemis, the ESDP mission in support of UN stabilization efforts 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. EUPOL Afghanistan the ESDP mission designed 
to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements 
under Afghan ownership.6 The final case study is the ESDP mission, EUNAVFOR 
Somalia off the Horn of Africa in support of anti-piracy efforts. These three cases were 
selected because they represent cases where the EU acted autonomously, outside of 
Europe, with significant risk to European forces. Furthermore, these three missions 
represent cases where significant deliberation should have been required to launch these 
missions; therefore, these missions are the most useful in determining EU motives for 
engaging in CSDP missions. This thesis then draws its conclusions based on the factors 
outlined by the three hypotheses that appeared most dominant in these three ESDP 
missions.  
                                                 
6“City Police and Justice Programme,” http://www.eupol-afg.eu/pdf/CPJP_FLYER.pdf. 
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II. CURRENT RESEARCH AND ARGUMENTS 
A.  SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTION BALANCING 
This chapter outlines the predominate arguments on the emergence of CSDP as a 
result of European integration. The arguments are presented and analyzed in order to 
develop three separate hypotheses to explain why the EU engages in crisis management 
operations under the framework of CSDP. The first argument suggests that the EU is a 
supranational institution that seeks to balance against the United States’ hegemonic 
position in international relations, and that EU uses ESDP missions as a means to balance 
against the hegemon. This argument is based on the Balance of Power Theory, which 
suggests that, due to the competitive nature of the international system, if the strength of 
one state increases, say militarily or economically in the international community, other 
weaker states are incentivized to create alliances in order to rival the first states’ increase 
in strength in order to maintain balance in the international system. “The purpose of 
balancing is to prevent a rising power from assuming hegemony, and if and when that 
prevention effort succeeds, a balance of power is expected to be present.”7 One side of 
the argument offers that the EU is in fact balancing against the hegemonic strength of the 
United States by taking on CSDP missions in areas that otherwise would be resolved by 
U.S. While, the other side argues the EU is not balancing at all; that the European Union 
is using CSDP missions to offer other avenues to crisis management. In either case 
dissecting the arguments of both sides is critical to analyzing what the motivators are 
behind Member State selection of CSDP missions. 
The first argument presented asserts the EU is balancing against the United 
States’ dominance in the international community. While there are two forms of 
balancing the predominant form of balancing discussed regarding the EU is soft 
balancing. “Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative  
 
                                                 
7 T. V. Paul, James Wirtz, and Michele Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 
21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 2. 
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exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be 
converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes 
intense and the powerful states becomes threatening.”8   
Robert J. Art, a leading scholar in international relations, argues in “Europe 
Hedges its Security Bets,” in Paul, Wirtz and Frontmann’s “Balance of Power” (2004) 
that the EU is using soft power means to balance against the United States in 
international relations. Additionally, he argues that the unilateralist tendencies of the 
United States has made the EU uneasy and driven it to create a more European means of 
crisis management. A system that engages various civilian and military instruments to 
resolve conflict and tends to be less military centric than the United States’ means of 
crisis management. By creating a more European means of crisis management, the EU 
has ultimately challenged the United States’ hegemonic position either directly or 
indirectly in European security and international relations. In other words, the emergence 
of CSDP means the United States and NATO no longer have a monopoly on crisis 
management. The EU has created a system of ad hoc cooperative missions, which offer 
an alternative to the United States in addressing conflict. International actors now have a 
choice in where they seek assistance in a crisis. This competition means the EU has more 
influence in the international community, as a competitor to the United States, as well as 
more influence in European security. Therefore, by offering CSDP as an alternative 
security provider to the United States, the EU has balanced against the U.S. hegemony in 
European security and increased its influence globally, as well as in its own security and 
defense.  
Art makes the distinction that the EU is not hard balancing against the United 
States, because the United States plays a vital role in European security, specifically in 
NATO. “Hard balancing is a strategy often exhibited by states engaged in intense 
interstate rivalry. States thus adopt strategies to build and update their military 
capabilities, as well as create and maintain formal alliance and counteralliances, to match 
the capabilities of their key opponents.”9 Furthermore, “There has been no ‘hard’ 
                                                 
8 Paul et al., eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 2. 
 9Paul et al., eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 3. 
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balancing by Europe against the United States because the United States does not 
represent a direct military threat to Europe’s security. The United States is, after all, 
Europe’s ally and protector.”10 Therefore, the Member States are not motivated to 
balance against the U.S. using hard power, because they wish to preserve its relative 
power as understood by the Balance of Power Theory. However, Art makes a different 
case with regards to events that have motivated the EU to engage in soft balancing to 
offset the relative unilateral power of the United States. 
Art’s argument explains the soft power balancing by Member States through 
CSDP has ensured the United States remains Europe’s primary protector while also 
providing the EU a means to exert influence on the way in which the United States 
provides security in Europe. By engaging in crisis management missions under CSDP, 
the EU has shown they can provide for their own security. This upsets the United States’ 
hegemonic position in European security that it has maintained for 60-plus years in 
NATO, because CSDP is a strictly EU instrument. Therefore, if the United States wants 
to maintain influence in European security, it has to consider what the EU wants or risk 
the EU taking unilateral action and hurting United States’ ability to exert influence in 
European security. Art (2004) cites four examples that purportedly support his thesis that 
the EU is using soft power to balance against the United States. The latter two examples 
regarding the Kosovo War and the emergence of ESDP, as well as the case of the Second 
Gulf War, and the French and German attempts to offset U.S. unilateralism, are of 
particular interest to this thesis.  
The first case, the Kosovo War, highlights “three tough lessons” the Europeans 
learned from the conflict as well as explains the resulting emergence of ESDP and what 
soft power theory suggests about its birth.11 The first lesson was, “in contemplating 
military intervention in the fall of 1998, they (Europeans) realized that they needed U.S. 
military power, especially the headquarters and planning capabilities of NATO…”12 The 
next lesson was, “while waging war in the spring of 1999, they (Europeans) learned 
                                                 
10 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 180. 
11 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 196. 
12 Paul et al., eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 196. 
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firsthand that a wide technological gap had opened up between their military forces and 
those of the United States and unable to interoperate fully with U.S. air power.”13 The 
final lesson that Art offers in the Kosovo War case is, “in retrospect, they realized that 
Washington’s military intervention was a ‘near miss’ and that the United States might not 
be willing to intervene in the next European crisis.”14 The lessons learned from the 
Kosovo War led to the Saint Malo declaration and ultimately the emergence of ESDP. 
The distinction that Art makes here about the emergence of ESDP is that “ESDP was 
both a hedge against U.S. inaction in the Next European crisis and a means to persuade 
the Americans to remain engaged in Europe.”15 In other words ESDP offered a means for 
the Europeans to show the United States that it was serious about providing for its own 
security and in turn keep the Americans in Europe. It also provided a means to address 
crises the United States elected to stay out of. “Thus, to the extent that balance of power 
theory helps us understand what the Europeans meant when they initially embarked on 
ESDP, it was to enhance their political influence within the transatlantic alliance through 
soft balancing…”16 
The next case Art provides illustrates the lesson learned by Europeans in the 
conflict leading up to the second Gulf War. Here Art explains,  
The second Gulf War drove home to them, even including those who 
supported U.S. policy toward Iraq, their inability to restrain Washington’s 
growing unilateralist impulses. If Kosovo demonstrated that the United 
States might not go to war when the Europeans wanted it to, then the 
second Gulf War demonstrated that the United States could go to war 
when the European did not want it to. Together, Kosovo and the second 
Gulf War demonstrated the two faces of U.S. unilateralism: an 
overwhelmingly powerful but potentially stand-aloof United States, and an 
overwhelmingly powerful and highly interventionist United States. 
Neither unilateralist face pleased the Europeans.17 
                                                 
13 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 196. 
14 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 196. 
15 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 197. 
16 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 199. 
17 Paul et al., eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 200. 
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The French and German displeasure with the seemly unchallengeable U.S. unilateralism 
drove France and Germany into closer cooperation in their efforts to stand against the 
U.S. unilateralism. “What the transatlantic fracture over Iraq means is that two significant 
European great powers—France and Germany—came out openly in favor of soft 
balancing, largely through political-diplomatic means against the United States, but with 
an apparent renewed commitment to ESDP.”18 Art argues that the British remained 
committed to the ideals of the “Saint-Malo agreement to create a more effective and 
robust European defense capability.”19 This cooperation in and commitment to ESDP by 
the British, French and Germans meant the Europeans had created a system that in their 
minds would allow for autonomous action in crisis management. Furthermore, that this 
system could potentially force the United States to rethink its unilateralist tendencies. As 
Art states, “All this means that Europe’s three biggest military powers remain committed 
to the ESDP project because they share the belief that a more robust European defense 
capability will give Europe more say over, and more independence from, American 
policies.”20 This cooperation among UK, France and Germany represents a means of 
balancing. These three weaker states are pooling together in ESDP in hopes of gaining 
influence with the United States and, thereby, increasing their relative position of power 
and ultimately the EU’s position in the global political power structure. 
 In sum, Art’s argument suggests the sparks of motivation for integration in 
European Security and Defense Policy have been the result of action or lack of action by 
the United States. In the case of Kosovo it was the lack of action that prompted the 
British and French to declare the need for greater autonomous crisis management by the 
Europeans. In the case of the second Gulf War it was the unilateral action of the United 
States that motivated the French and Germans to cooperate more closely in support for a 
European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The two cases would therefore suggest that the 
EU is pooling its capabilities behind ESDP as a means to balance against the United 
States unilateralism. Furthermore, as Art discusses this is not a means of hard balancing 
                                                 
18 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 204. 
19 Paul et al.,  eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 204. 
20Paul et al., eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 206. 
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as the United States is not a threat to Europe, but instead a means of soft balancing in 
order for the EU to maintain or gain on its relative position of power with respect to the 
United States.  
 Barry Posen, another scholar in international relations, makes a similar claim in 
his International Spectator Article titled, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power”. As 
he states, “the causes and timing of ESDP’s birth suggests that it is indeed a response to 
U.S. hegemony. Its limits suggest it is not quite a balancing project, but certainly an 
effort by Europeans, including many who bandwagon in their NATO guise, to develop an 
alternative security supplier.”21  
 Posen, however, goes on to offer several different suggestions that may have 
sparked the rise of ESDP. That ESDP is the result of a rise in what Posen calls “EU-ism,” 
a natural extension of the integration process. In other words, as Member States have 
been pooling their sovereignty in efforts to integrate on lower politics, ESDP seems to be 
the result of linear progression in EU integration. However, Posen suggests that the 
timing of creating ESDP cannot be explained by the consequences of increased European 
integration. Why did it only gain momentum after 1998?  Next, Posen suggests that 
ESDP has gained momentum because UK saw ESDP as a place to have an acceptable 
role in the EU, a place where its military capabilities could be showcased. As Posen 
states, “UK hit upon ESDP as an issue where it could lead, pursuing both prestige and 
power in the EU.”22 The Balkans was a wakeup call to the Europeans about their military 
capabilities and their reliance on the United States. “At least two lessons were drawn 
from the Balkan experience: first, for some crises only military force will do; second, the 
U.S. will not always be interested in problems on Europe’s periphery.”23 While Posen 
has offered up several different explanations to the recent spark in ESDP efforts by the 
Europeans, he ultimately concludes that ESDP is the result of U.S. unilateralism and 
hegemonic position. “Though many factors have contributed to this recent progress,  
                                                 
21 Barry R. Posen “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” The International Spectator XXXIX 
(1/2004): 12. 
22 Posen “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” 13. 
23 Posen “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” 14. 
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specific problems posed by the hegemonic position of the U.S. appear particularly 
important. Viewed in this light, ESDP is a form of balance-of-power behavior, albeit a 
weak form.”24  
Others argue that it is misleading to suggest that ESDP is a form of balancing and 
that there is little empirical support for that hypothesis. Howorth argues that many 
overlook the intent of ESDP. Howorth cites the ESS and the Saint Malo declaration as 
two specific statements by the Europeans, which highlight the importance of the 
transatlantic alliance and further that ESDP is a vehicle for the EU to strengthen the 
alliance. As he states, “There is little room for ambiguity in these statements: the 
objective of ESDP is to relieve the U.S. army from regional crisis management 
responsibilities in Europe in order to allow Washington to make better use of its military 
elsewhere in the world.”25 This type of partnership is not possible given the purpose 
behind ESDP.   
Aside from the empirical evidence, Howoth and Menon suggest that ESDP as an 
example of balancing is stretching the meaning of balancing behavior. The authors write, 
Critics have pointed to the dangers inherent in adopting too permissive a 
definition of balancing, arguing that what is often referred to as soft 
balancing is, in reality, nothing more than “standard diplomatic 
bargaining” relabeled because “real balancing…was cleared off the 
agenda…with the end of the Cold War” (Lieber and Alexander 2005). 
Such “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970) renders “balancing” 
indistinguishable from “normal diplomatic friction.” (Brooks and 
Wohlforth 2005)26 
If the EU acting on its own in areas of interest to the United States is interpreted as 
balancing, then it is harder to distinguish between common politics and balancing 
behavior. Furthermore, such a broad definition of balancing makes the empirical 
evidence less meaningful.  
                                                 
24 Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” 17.   
25 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Plagrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 50–51. 
26 Howorth, and A. Menon. “Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Balancing the 
United States.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution  53, no. 5 (October 1, 2009): 731. 
 16
 Joining sides with Howorth and Menon are Brooks and Wohlforth who also argue 
that Art has stretched the definition of soft balancing in order to apply it to the European 
Union’s efforts in the development of ESDP. Brooks and Wohlforth also argue that by 
the classical definition of balancing, “we still have no concrete indicator of European 
governments’ willingness to sacrifice other objectives—welfare, prosperity, even state 
sovereignty (the ESDP remains entirely intergovernmental, not supranational)—in the 
interests of developing a genuine counterweight to U.S. power.”27  
Despite these disagreements, there is consensus that CSDP and the pooling of 
military capabilities is not an example of hard balancing against the United States. 
Furthermore, that the EU does not see the United States as a threat because the United 
States is tied to European defense through NATO. However, where the argument does 
seem to focus is on what CSDP is and what the EU is using it for. This argument leads to 
the development of the first hypothesis, which suggests that CSDP missions are selected 
based on their likelihood to soft balance against the United States’ hegemonic position. 
This would then suggest that the CSDP missions are selected because they somehow 
provide a means for the EU to undermine the United States’ influence in crisis 
management and thereby upset the U.S. hegemony. In other words, the mission would be 
selected because it upsets the one stop shopping for crisis management system offered by 
the United States. CSDP provides the EU the vehicle to offer a more civilian centric 
means of crisis management, which is counter to the United States predominantly 
military centric means of crisis management. Clearly stated the first hypothesis is: EU 
Member States agree to take on CSDP missions based on the likelihood that doing so 
challenges the U.S. position in the world and increases the EU’s relative influence in the 
international system.  
B. NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE BIG THREE 
The next theory that attempts to explain why the EU has supported crisis 
management under CSDP suggests that CSDP reflects the convergence of the national 
                                                 
27 Brooks and Wohlforth, “Brooks and Wohlforth Reply.” International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 
2005/2006): 188. 
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interests of the Big Three—UK, France and Germany. Those in favor of this argument 
tend to cite events like the Saint Malo declaration, where the national interests of France 
and UK ultimately converged and led to the joint declaration for a more autonomous EU 
military Capability. Others cite CSDP as a means to serve French and UK interests of 
stability and development in their former colonial regions of Africa. The counter- 
argument suggests the Big Three are not attempting to serve their own interests but to 
serve the interests of the EU as a whole. In other words the Big Three use their economic, 
military and political power as a catalyst for European influence through CSDP in 
international crisis management rather than an institution that serves their own individual 
interests.  
In order to understand how the national interests of the Big Three can come to the 
forefront in the EU and in CSDP it is important to review three points. First, the structure 
of the EU governing institutions, specifically The Council of the European Union also 
referred to as the Council of Ministers, and how CSDP missions are agreed on. The 
second point to consider is how CSDP missions come before The Council of Ministers 
for a vote. Finally, that the EU is a supranational institution in some areas and an 
intergovernmental institution in others, which means Member States’ national interests, 
can influence decisions in the Council of Ministers. 
“The Council of Ministers is the forum in which national government ministers 
meet to make decisions on EU law and policy. It is the primary champion of national 
interests and one of the most powerful of the EU institutions.”28 Furthermore, security 
and defense is not a part of the “‘Community’ domain—i.e., areas of action where the 
member states have decided to pool their sovereignty and delegate decision-making 
powers to the EU institutions.”29 Instead security and defense fall under the realm of 
“intergovernmental cooperation” where the national representatives debate, challenge and  
 
                                                 
28 John McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 
133. The term Council of Ministers can be used interchangeably with The Council of the European Union.  
29 “The Council of the European Union.” http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/council/index_en.htm 
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compromise in order to agree on a policy.30 In addition, all CSDP missions are agreed 
upon by a unanimous vote, therefore, every Member State has an opportunity to have 
their interests represented in the Council of Ministers.  
Also important to understand in the process of CSDP mission selection is how a 
mission makes it to the Council of Ministers. There are three ways a mission can end up 
in front of the Council of Ministers for a vote. First, a mission can be recommended by a 
Member State. The Member State recommends to the Council that the EU plan and 
execute a CSDP mission in support of a particular crisis. The Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), the body responsible for making CFSP recommendation to the 
Council of Ministers, will, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, go through 
three phases of planning to define the respective mission. The Council of Ministers in the 
Foreign Affairs Council configuration will then vote on the mission for approval or 
disapproval. 
The second means by which a mission can end up in front of the Council of 
Ministers is by a request from an outside state or international organization like the UN. 
The mission is again defined by the PSC and voted on by the Council.  The third means 
by which a CSDP mission can end up in front of the Council of Minister for a vote is in 
an emergency, where the Joint Situation Center (SITCEN), the EU organization tasked 
with sharing intelligence among Member States and providing early warning reports in 
the event of a crisis, advises the PSC of a crisis. The PSC will then make a 
recommendation to the Council of Ministers for a mission to resolve the crisis. The 
process by which an CSDP mission is voted on and the process by which an CSDP 
mission is defined are important to understand in framing the national interest argument 
surrounding CSDP.  
The national interest argument surrounding the emergence of ESDP and now 
CSDP can be traced back to the Saint Malo declaration. Citing the declaration by two of 
the most powerful military countries in the EU was an act to serve their own national 
interests.  Some argue that ESDP was a means for the British to have a more significant 
                                                 
30 “The Council of the European Union.” 
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role in the EU. “As one of the two biggest defense spenders in the Union and 
acknowledged even by the French as its most accomplished military power, UK hit upon 
ESDP as an issue where it could lead, pursuing both prestige and power in the EU.”31  
Some argue the St Malo Declaration by France and the UK represents a 
convergence of national interests. British interests are served by exerting influence in a 
policy area where they are comfortable, which is security and defense. The UK also 
favors greater defense and security cooperation, in order to show the United States that 
the Europeans are capable of making a greater contribution to European defense. This 
ensures the United States stays in Europe and maintains its level of support for NATO. 
The UK is not, however, in support of a European Army or any attempt by the EU to 
rival NATO. The Conservative Party was very skeptical of integration in the military 
realm so much so that their skepticism led to an outright rejection of the entire integration 
process. The Labour Party on the other hand “was not inhibited by concerns that adding a 
competency in security to the EU would contribute to its development as an organization 
that threatens national decision-making autonomy.”32 With the election of the Labour 
Party shortly before the St Malo summit the doors were open to join the UK’s interests 
with France’s in ESDP. 
Much like the UK, France’s national interests are served through CSDP by having 
greater influence in the EU in areas that are important to France namely CSDP. CSDP 
represents a means for the French to lobby Europeans to pursue French policies. That by 
supporting CSDP France could use the EU to rival the United States.  
In an attempt not to be left behind after the Saint Malo summit, some argue that 
Germany chose to support ESDP as a means to incorporate European military forces to 
serve greater European integration. That by integrating EU military force the EU could 
foster greater legitimacy in their missions. The convergence of the Big Three in support 
of ESDP has motivated some to suggest that CSDP is a means for a Member State, 
especially the Big Three, to exert influence in order to protect their national interests. 
                                                 
31 Posen “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” 13. 
32 Brian Rathbun Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the 
Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 155. 
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National interests more specifically can be categorized as economic interests of the 
Member States; political interests of the Member States both domestic and international; 
as well as Member States’ security for their borders and their citizens. Therefore, the 
argument would suppose that voting in the Council of Ministers on CSDP mission in 
some function serves one of the categorized interests above. Those decisions within the 
Council of Ministers are somehow influenced solely by the Big Three in an attempt to 
serve their interests.  
For example, Gorm Rye Olsen, a leading author on EU involvement in Africa 
argues, in his International Peace Keeping article titled, “The EU and Military Conflict 
Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe,” “that development of a 
military conflict management policy has been and still is motivated by European 
concerns and European interests. Only secondly is it motivated by concerns for Africa.”33 
More specifically, “Because CFSP/ESDP conflict management is guided by the principle 
of intergovernmentalism, some member states, particularly France, exert significant 
influence on the EU’s conflict management policy in Africa.”34 Olsen goes on to argue 
that France’s national interests in Africa stem from its colonial history. He makes this 
same distinction for the UK as well. He claims that both Member States share a sense of 
accountability to promote stability and development in Africa, as a result of their early 
colonial ambitions on the continent. Olsen makes the argument that both France and the 
UK have remained interested in Africa to ensure stability and to encourage 
development.35 Furthermore, Olsen hypothesizes “that the EU is a means for former 
colonial powers to re-engage in Africa and use the EU as an instrument for taking care of  
 
 
                                                 
33 Gorm Rye Olsen “The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or 
Europe?” International Peacekeeping, 16 no. 2 (April 2009): 245.  
34  Olsen “The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe,” 
245. 
35 Olsen “The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe,” 
250. 
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their specific national concerns.”36 In other words the CSDP represents a means for 
Member States to engage in multilateral crisis management missions to serve their own 
national interests. 
Frederic Merand, a predominate scholar on CSDP makes a different assertion in 
his 2006 Cooperation and Conflict article. Merand attempts to explain EU motive of 
CSDP by employing arguments based on the construction of a state’s identity. “Foreign 
and defense policy-makers from France, Germany and the United Kingdom have shaped 
ESDP by projecting their respective social representations, notably with regard to the role 
of the state, the nature of security challenges and purpose of their organization.”37 Policy-
makers were programmed in their way of thinking by their national origins and 
institutional background. Diplomats from Germany view the role of ESDP differently 
than the military officials from UK; not because of different national interests, but 
because of different programming or, as Mernad refers to it, different social 
representations. “Hence, when they utter the words ‘European defense policy,’ UK 
representatives will stress policy, the French will underscore defense, and the Germans 
will emphasize Europe.”38 Therefore, CSDP cannot be viewed in terms of interests of the 
Member States, “without some understanding of the social representations enacted by the 
actors who make ESDP, that is, without understanding the cognitive materials with which 
ESDP is made, it is difficult to understand the content of the policy or its development.”39 
Adrian Hyde-Price, a Professor of International Politics at Bath University, argues 
in his chapter titled, “Interests, Institutions and Identities in the Study of European 
Foreign Policy,” that examining the EU from the perspective of Member States’ interests 
is no longer appropriate. Furthermore, he suggests that perhaps Member State interests 
shaped the way the institution is organized, but those interests alone cannot fully explain 
the decision-making process within the Council of Ministers. He also suggests scholars 
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need to expand international relations theory to encompass a new international actor like 
the European Union. That conventional theory currently does not fully explain the EU 
and its foreign policy. In sum, Hyde-Prices’ argument falls in the middle of the argument 
that CSDP is a means for Member States to serve their national interests. His argument 
dismisses the neo-realist attempts at explaining EU foreign policy and adopts a more 
social constructivist and new institutionalist theory in attempt to understand EU foreign 
policy. By adopting these new theories, Hyde-Price, highlights the role of interests, 
institutions and identity in the foreign policy of the EU and the emergence of ESDP.  
While making his argument for the role of interests in EU foreign policy he makes 
the following distinction, 
The central problem in defining the ‘European interest’ of the EU is how 
to distinguish between the interests of the EU as a whole and those of the 
specific interests of its individual member states and other influential non 
state-actors within it (such as the agricultural lobby). Once one discards 
neo-realist assumptions about states and international actors as rational 
utility maximisers in favor of a conception of international actors as 
complex institutional ensembles, then ‘European’ interests can only be 
seen as the outcome of a discrete political process.40 
In other words, Member State interests may play a role in the negotiating that takes place 
in the Council of Ministers, but just as important is the role-played by the institution 
itself. “The analysis of the EU’s interests thus involve consideration of both the political 
discourse surrounding its external role conceptions and of the institutional policy-making 
process within the EU.”41 Furthermore, he argues, this process and seemingly shared 
interests, for the institution itself, creates an identity of the EU in international politics. 
As he states, “European identity thus provides the cognitive framework within which the 
EU’s foreign and security policy is formulated.”42  
                                                 
40 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Interest, institutions and identities in the study of European foreign policy,” in 
Ben Tora and Thomas Christiansen  (eds), Rethinking European Foreign Policy, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004: 102.  
41 Hyde-Price, “Interest, institutions and identities in the study of European foreign policy,” 102. 
42 Hyde-Price, “Interest, institutions and identities in the study of European foreign policy,” 109. 
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 The various points along the national interests argument spectrum lead to the 
second hypothesis of this thesis, which states, Member States support CSDP missions, 
because the missions serve the national interests of the Member States, specifically the 
interests of the Big Three. This hypothesis captures the full range of the national interests 
argument, to include the European interest argument offered by Hyde-Price. If one sees 
Member States taking on CSDP missions that do not serve their own national interests, 
but serve the interests or identity of the European Union then Hyde-Price’s argument is 
supported. More explanation of this point will be provided in the case study analysis 
portion of this thesis.  
C. POLICY STANCES OF NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES  
The third hypothesis, tested in this thesis, argues that the partisan character of 
national governments accounts for the emergence of CSDP. Political parties have their 
own foreign policy agendas and security preferences and these preferences matter when 
negotiating and deliberating in the Council of Ministers on ESDP missions. The decision 
to intervene militarily is the consequence of national political parties negotiating within 
the Council of Ministers. In other words the Council Members vote according to the 
preferences of the party in power of their respective government. The party the Council 
Member likely belongs to. For example if the Labour Party were in the majority in UK 
one would expect to see the Council Member vote in alignment with the Labour Party’s 
foreign policy stance. This thesis primarily examines the political stances of the major 
parties in the UK, France and Germany. The reason the Big Three’s political parties are 
focused on is, because they spend the most on defense; have the largest populations in 
Europe; and the strongest economies and are, therefore, most likely to have significant 
influence over Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP missions.  
Brian Rathbun, an international relations scholar argues in his book “Partisan 
Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans,” that 
national political parties affect European security policy in two ways. “First, parties 
articulate and implement very different policies in the areas of humanitarian intervention 
and European defense cooperation…Second, the policy-seeking argument maintains that 
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by and large parties win elections to formulate policies rather than formulate policies to 
win elections.”43 Rathbun supports his argument showing how the Conservative Party 
was skeptical of European integration out of fear it would encroach on state/national 
sovereignty.44 In contrast, the Labour Party had a different perspective on integration. As 
Rathbun explains, “The Labour Party was not inhibited by concerns that adding a 
competency in security to the EU would contribute to its development as an organization 
that threatens national decision-making autonomy.”45 Therefore, it was not until after the 
Labour Party was elected that Tony Blair could make the assertions he and Jacques 
Chirac made at the summit in Saint Malo regarding a credible and autonomous military 
force.  
Rathbun goes on to support his argument by identifying and explaining the 
ideologies of leading national parties in Germany and France and their split on support 
for the emergence of ESDP. In Germany the major leftist party, the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany (SPD), was opposed to “militarization” within the Europe Union. 
Where as the major rightist party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was for it. In 
France the Union for the Popular Movement (UMP), closely aligned with the former 
Gaullists, and the Socialist Party (PS) both supported the emergence of ESDP, but for 
different reasons. As Rathbun states, “the Gaullists consider it another instrumental 
means of promoting French grandeur, while the Socialists emphasize its pragmatic 
operational functions as well as its contribution to the general process of political 
integration.”46 
Kris Pence, an international relations scholar and Professor of Political Science at 
Indiana University, explains in his paper prepared for the 2008 Midwest Political Science 
Association meeting, why political parties, in the Big Three, offered different stances on 
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CFSP. In his paper, he groups political parties into four categories based on how they 
position themselves relative to CFSP. His first group is “Proximity;”  based on how 
closely a party aligns itself with public opinion.47 The next group he calls “Party 
Competition” and is based on how parties adjust their policies to attract more voters.48 
The third group he calls “Party Family” and is defined by where the party aligns itself on 
the left-right political spectrum.49 The final group is the “Party Position Accentuation,” 
which is based on parties who do not make policies in foreign policy, but instead choose 
to advance some other policy as their primary political goal.50 
Pence concludes, “The most important factor suggests party positions are a 
reflection of the type of interests the party represents. The work supports the use of a new 
spectrum that denotes the relative importance parties place on national sovereignty issues 
to those of alternative issues which may be handled at levels beyond the nation-state.”51 
Pence’s findings suggest that for some parties foreign policy is a key political issue, 
while for others it is not as important. This finding is counter to Rathbun’s assertion that 
parties are policy seekers; attempting to align themselves with the greatest number of 
voters possible. 
The opposing sides of this debate suggest that different parties in power will 
result in different foreign policy objectives by the Member State. If the Conservative 
Party were in power, in UK, then one would expect more unilateralism and limited 
British participation in CSDP missions. If the Labour Party were in power one would 
expect more multilateral cooperation and greater British participation in CSDP missions. 
These two simple examples of how national political parties’ foreign policy agendas 
impact how Member States support CSDP missions, as well as the two sides to the 
political party argument presented above lead to the development of the final hypothesis. 
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48 Pence, Paper for the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 9. 
49 Pence, Paper for the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 9. 
50 Pence, Paper for the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 9. 
51 Pence, Paper for the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 29. 
 26
The third and final hypothesis states, national political parties’ foreign policy stances 
dominate the decision-making process in the Council of Ministers and therefore, motivate 
when the EU engages in CSDP missions.  
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. METHODOLOGY   
By examining the available literature this thesis analyzes the events surrounding 
the selection of an ESDP mission to determine which of the three hypotheses best 
explains Member State motives to engage in CSDP missions. This analysis is necessary, 
because debates and negotiations that occur within the Council of Ministers on ESDP 
missions are not made public. The focus will be on three specific ESDP missions, 
Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUPOL Afghanistan the EU 
Police mission and the EU NAVFOR Somalia mission Operation Atalanta. The three 
cases were selected because they represent three out of area EU crisis management 
missions. Furthermore, all three cases represent areas where there was significant threat 
to EU Forces and therefore, it is likely that greater debate took place within the Council 
of Ministers and Member States. Meaning, if the missions were low risk missions there 
would be little debate because there were little risk to EU Forces and, therefore, little 
political risk to elected officials.  
If the first hypothesis, that the EU is a supranational institution motivated to 
conduct CSDP missions to balance against the United States is the dominant reason for 
CSDP mission selection, then one would expect to see any of the following. First, a clear 
statement that the proposed mission will rival the United States’ position. Second, if the 
motivation is balancing by rivaling the U.S. then the missions should take place 
somewhere the United States has an interest or expressed an interest or is at least 
operating. Lastly, the statements or actions by the Member States should suggest a 
benefit offered by the EU, in the CSDP mission, that is not offered by the United States.  
For the second hypothesis, that the Big Three Member States’ national interests 
are the primary motives for CSDP missions, one would expect to see the following. First, 
that the most interested Member State would willingly bear the greatest financial burden 
for the mission. Second, that the Member State would offer to lead the mission and 
provide the headquarters or be the Framework Nation for the mission. Lastly, statements 
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from the Member State’s officials would domestically be discussing how the mission is 
good for that respective country, whereas in the Council of Ministers, the Member State’s 
officials would be expressing how the mission is good for the EU as a whole. 
For the last hypothesis, that Member States’ national political party stances are 
the predominant motives for CSDP mission selection, one would expect to find the 
following. First, the ESDP missions selected, when the respective party was in power, 
would align with that party’s foreign policy stance. Meaning, if a party supports defense 
spending in their government one may see support for military ESDP missions. Where as 
if the party is strictly against military action there may be support for civilian ESDP 
missions or no mission at all. Second, one would expect to see missions supported or 
opposed based on the prevalent electoral issue at the time in the Member States. Current 
austerity measures by a number of Member States may be in line with party stances, 
therefore, reduced support for costly ESDP missions may be a factor of the current 
political environment in the Member State. Lastly, if party politics do motivate ESDP 
missions we would expect to see a change in support for missions after a change in 
government. For example if the Labour Party was in power in the UK we may expect to 
see support for a certain style of ESDP mission. However, if after an election cycle the 
government changes and there is a change in support for that type of ESDP mission then 
this may suggest party politics played a role in the change of support for the mission.  
The next section of this thesis analyzes the three cases to determine which of the 
three hypotheses best explains the EU Member States’ motives for engaging in CSDP 
missions. The findings of the analysis will aid in the determination of which of the three 
hypotheses best explain mission selection and ultimately what motivates Member States 
to engage in CSDP missions.   
B. OPERATION ARTEMIS 
In February 2003, the fighting between the Union des Patriots Congolais (UPC), 
“a militia composed of northern Hema and with close ties to Rwanda,”52 and the Front de 
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Resistance Patriots de l’Ituri (FPRI), made up mainly of Lendu, in Ituri province in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) displaced nearly 600,000 Congolese 
people. The Ituri province is a mineral rich region of the DRC that has been sought over 
for many years. “More than a dozen ethnic militias and the governments of Rwanda, 
Uganda and DRC have fought for power and control over Ituri’s resources.”53  
The humanitarian crisis in the Ituri province in the DRC gained international 
attention when the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan asked the 
international community for assistance to stabilize the region in the Ituri. The request was 
for international forces to stabilize the region long enough to allow UN forces to be 
deployed in September of 2003. On May 12, 2003, two days after UNSG appealed to the 
international community for assistance, “the UPC attacked and took Bunia,”54 Bunia is a 
city in the Ituri province where the UN base was located and protected by 700 Uruguayan 
troops. 
Shortly after the request by UNSG Kofi Annan, France agreed “to lead a 
multinational force to intervene before more UN troops were deployed on the ground.”55  
France’s only stipulations to leading the international forces were for a limited mission, a 
UN mandate for the operation, and for neighboring countries to acknowledge France was 
there in support of the UN. “Since the UPC had links to Rwanda, and since Uganda had 
maintained links to other militias, France would deploy forces only if all the involved 
governments in the region accepted the operation.” 
On May 16, 2003, France announced it was prepared to lead the operation to the 
DRC, Operation Mamba, as the French had titled it.56 Shortly after planning the mission 
France proposed the mission to the European Union as an opportunity for an ESDP 
mission. On May 30, 2003, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
Resolution 1484 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Resolution sanctioned the 
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deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to Bunia. On June 12, 
2003, the Council of Ministers adopted Council Decision 432/CFSP for an ESDP mission 
to Bunia. The mission mandate had three objectives.  
The general objective was the stabilization of the town and the 
improvement of the humanitarian situation. The second, more specific 
objective was to ensure the protection of the airport and of those internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) stationed in camps in the town. Thirdly, the 
protection of the civilian population, UN personnel and humanitarian 
presence had to be ensured, if needed.57 
This operation, codenamed Artemis, was the first military ESDP mission outside of 
NATO, autonomously conducted by the European Union. “The Europeanisation of an 
initially French-led operation made it possible to initiate ESDP operations outside the 
Berlin Plus framework It also tested the ‘framework nation’ concept.”58 Fourteen 
Member States would contribute to Operation Artemis. It would involve nearly 2,000 
European troops, and last from June 12, 2003, to September 1, 2003, and cost the 
European Union approximately 7 million Euro.59   
 Ultimately the mission achieved the objectives set out in the Council Mandate. 
The airport was secured in Bunia. The EU troops had quelled the violence in the city of 
Bunia and surrounding areas, where possible. This reduced the human suffering and 
killing that was occurring in the city. The mission was then turned over in September 
2003, to new UN Forces who would remain in place to continue the UN mission. 
 Analysis of the events surrounding Operation Artemis suggest that factors best 
supported by the second hypothesis dominated the motives of the EU to engage in an 
ESDP mission in the DRC. More specifically, the national interests of France, one of the 
largest Member States, dominated the decision-making process in the Council of 
Ministers. France’s motivation to lead the EU mission was so dominant that it assumed 
nearly all of the risk associated with the mission, thereby, making it easy for the ministers 
from the 15 Member States to come to consensus on the mission.  
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 When UNSG Kofi Annan asked the international community for assistance in the 
Ituri province it was France that was first willing to lead a mission to the DRC. France 
has long sought to exert influence in Africa; traceable back to its history as a colonial 
power. Even more recently France’s government officials have discussed the significance 
of Africa in terms of France’s interests. On June 13, 2003, the day after the EU launched 
Operation Artemis, M. Dominique de Villepin, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
discussed the future of Africa and French relations. He spoke of how France and Africa’s 
interests are related. Specifically he stated, 
The relaunch of the development efforts remains an essential condition for 
the return to peace. Under President Chirac’s impetus, France has 
constantly argued for this in all the major international fora – Monterrey, 
Kananaskis, Johannesburg, Kyoto and Evian. Our country will increase its 
official development assistance by 50% over the next five years, raising it 
to 0.7% in 2012. In this framework, our priority goes to the African 
continent, to which we devote 60% of our money and we want to 
concentrate our efforts in the first place on the objectives defined by the 
African countries themselves in the NEPAD framework, moving from an 
assistance-based system to one of partnership.60 
Then again, on the June 18, 2003, France’s Mister of Foreign Affairs spoke about French 
and African interests. “It’s a young continent, with considerable economic potential, 
strong growth and a huge natural heritage. Africa Provides France with a window of 
opportunity. It broadens our horizons and enhances our aspiration to see action taken on 
the international stage.”61   
 Theses statements speak to France’s national interests in Africa. The national 
economic interests with such a large portion of France’s Development Aid going to 
Africa are clearly discussed in the first statement. The second quote speaks to France’s 
national political interests of prestige and power. In either case, stability on the African 
continent is certainly within the national interests of France. Stability in Africa, as a  
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function of France’s national economic and security interests, paired with former colonial 
power pursuits in the region are the potential motives for France’s willingness to lead a 
mission to the DRC. 
 France had initiated planning of the mission at nearly the same time as UNSG 
Kofi Annan was asking for assistance. The answer to the question of whether the EU 
would take on the mission was unclear. “On 19 May the Council of the EU (Political and 
Security Committee, PSC) requested Solana to study the feasibility of an EU military 
operation in the DR…Solana hinted that the EU could send a small force to Bunia for a 
short period, but added that the decision will take ‘months, not days.’”62 Three weeks 
later on June 12, 2003 the EU would launch Operation Artemis. The reason the EU could 
respond so much faster than expected was, because of all the work in the lead up to the 
mission had done by France. 
 Operation Artemis was nearly planned, funded, and supported entirely by France. 
“In fact it was the French government that took the lead in formulating an EU response, 
proposing that the EU provide the force in the form of an autonomous operation, with 
France acting as a framework nation.”63 On June 7, 2003, five days before the EU 
launched Operation Artemis, France had sent more than 1,400 troops to Bunia.64 More to 
the point, the French troops were going to the DRC regardless of the EU adopting the 
mission. “Meanwhile, the French focus on persuading colleagues in the PSC that the 
mission was feasible and would strengthen the ESDP.”65 The lopsidedness of the troop 
numbers helps illustrate how French dominated this mission was. Of the nearly 2,000 
European Union troops supporting Operation Artemis 1,700 of the troops were French.  
All in all 14 Member States contributed to Artemis, among others, 
Belgium (23 medical staff and tactical and strategic aircrafts), Germany 
(34 based in Entebbe for medical evacuation), Sweden (approximately 70 
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troops in special forces) and the UK (up to 85 staff among whom 
engineers and sappers in Bunia, support staff in Entebbe).66  
Sweden was the only Member State to send combat troops; the rest of the troops sent by 
Member States filled a support role. Furthermore, the Operational Headquarters for the 
mission was in Paris and France was the Framework Nation.  
 France had assumed nearly all of the risk associated with this mission. Therefore, 
there was little to debate within the Council of Ministers, which made getting the 
mandate from the EU relatively easy and took only weeks as opposed to months as 
Solana had suggested.   
 The fact that France suggested the EU take on the mission under the framework of 
ESDP is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it is interesting, because of the timing 
of the mission. The Big Three had not been able to come to a consensus on the United 
States led invasion of Iraq, therefore, Operation Artemis provided a means for the 
Europeans to mend the rift created by the second Iraq War. Secondly, the location of the 
operation, Africa, was not likely to be challenged by the United States, because the U.S. 
was preoccupied in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lastly, the scope of the mission was extremely 
limited in time and location. More specifically, the mission was only intended to take 
place from June to September of 2003. Additionally, the location of the mission was 
isolated to the City of Bunia not the entire DRC or even all of Ituri. 
 Operation Artemis would certainly serve the EU’s aspirations of leading 
autonomous missions outside of NATO, but it would also serve the interests of France. 
As Adrien Jahier, a predominant scholar in international relations explains in “ESDP 
Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Analysis,” 
It is commonly acknowledged that French foreign policy follows two main 
trends: on the one hand, a supranational, more normative approach to 
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on enhancing the role of France as a great international actor. Indeed, it 
seems that France used the EU as a means [to] pursue both European and 
its own national interests.67 
In other words, Operation Artemis provided a means for France to serve its foreign policy 
as well its own national interests. Jahier also explains, 
After the controversial French Operation Turquoise in Rwanda (1994), the 
country needed to restore its reputation in Africa through the 
implementation of a successful mission with the official humanitarian 
goals. Furthermore, intervention under the European flag limited the risks 
of casualties to French troops, and reduced the possible negative 
repercussions in French public opinion polls.68 
Jahier’s explanation of France’s motives to gain EU support of the mission, under the 
framework of ESDP, is an attempt by France to serve its own national interests. 
Furthermore, it was in the national interests of France to strengthen the EU and ESDP. In 
this case the dominance of France in nearly all aspects of Operation Artemis certainly 
support the second hypothesis, however, factors that support the other two hypotheses are 
not absent from Operation Artemis.  
 Evidence for support of the first hypothesis can be found in the fact that the UK 
and Germany both saw the importance of the mission for the legitimacy of the EU as a 
foreign policy actor. Moreover, that the ESDP mission to the DRC would be an 
appropriate opportunity to highlight the legitimacy of ESDP as well as to mend the rift 
between the Big Three. The motives in this case were to support the EU as a 
supranational institution capable of exerting influence abroad and not just as a coalition 
of the willing acting. Operation Artemis was an opportunity for the EU to speak in the 
international arena with one voice on foreign policy. This voice came from Javier Solana, 
EU High Representative for CFSP, who stated, “The European Union is ready to face this 
important challenge. I want to thank all concerned for their efforts to make sure that we 
were able to react rapidly to the UN Secretary-General’s call, as well as all contributors 
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to the operation for their generosity and in particular France for taking the lead.”69 This is 
significant, because the EU, as a supranational institution, had one person speaking on its 
behalf. With one person speaking on behalf of the EU mission it solidified Operation 
Artemis as a EU mission and gave legitimacy to ESDP. All of the above points, which 
served to bolster legitimacy for ESDP, support the first hypothesis 
 Furthermore, the execution of Operation Artemis represented an opportunity for 
the EU to operate outside of NATO and outside of the influence of the United States. The 
fact that United States had reservations about this new autonomous capability being 
shown by the EU also supports the first hypothesis. Operation Artemis was an 
autonomous mission conducted by the EU, not by France, Germany and UK, but by the 
EU. This distinction is important because the EU became an alternative in crisis 
management in a market dominated by United States and NATO. This alternate choice 
and U.S. reservation of ESDP speaks to the EU seeking to balance against the U.S. 
Therefore, while the second hypothesis is dominant in Operation Artemis the first 
hypothesis cannot be completely discounted.   
 As a result of France assuming most of the risk there was little evidence to 
support the third hypothesis. The Green Party in Germany came out in favor of the need 
for a response in the DRC and the support of a mission. Tony Blair’s response to support 
the EU mission was in line with the Labour Party’s stance on ESDP military missions. 
However, the mission was designed to prevent human suffering and abuses, and it is 
tough for a political party to take a stance against helping where there is human suffering. 
Therefore, in the case of Operation Artemis it appears national political parties had little 
influence in the selection of this particular ESDP mission. 
 The events surrounding the first autonomous ESDP mission to Africa weigh 
heavily in support of the national interests hypothesis. France had assumed most of the 
risk and cost and, therefore, consensus in the Council of Ministers was easier than if 
Member States were forced to assume more political risk. The limited scope and duration 
of the mission also made consensus easier to achieve. There was some support of the first 
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hypothesis in the case of Operation Artemis; however, the dominance of France’s role 
suggests that national interests were the predominant motive for Operation Artemis. 
France was able to maintain its influence in Africa, thereby serving it economic and 
political interests. France took the lead on the mission within the EU thereby serving its 
interests of prestige and French greatness. Operation Artemis also provided France the 
opportunity to be preserved as a leader both politically and militarily within the EU.  
C.  EUPOL AFGHANISTAN 
 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched after the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks in the United States. OEF was a UN sanctioned missions to remove the 
oppressive Taliban regime from Afghanistan. Shortly after the launch of OEF the UN 
also established a mandate to support future reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The 
mandate prompted the international community to take steps to rebuild Afghanistan after 
the Taliban was removed. “The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), a 
peacekeeping force set up under the framework of UNSC Resolution 1378, was to aid the 
interim government in developing national security structures, to assist the country’s 
reconstruction, and to assist in developing and training future Afghan security forces.”70 
 The first efforts at rebuilding Afghanistan came in the form of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs were nationally sponsored entities used to 
support various reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. “In October 2006, all the 
existing PRTs in Afghanistan were formally placed under the ISAF umbrella, which has 
been under NATO command since August 2003.”71 The PRTs have lacked coordination 
and “have by and large acted autonomously from one another, with strong links to 
respective national capitals and little coordination on the ground.”72 The lack of 
coordination and overlapping efforts from the international community has made 
reconstruction efforts fairly ineffective. Compounding the ineffectiveness is the 
insurgency challenge faced by the PRTs and their respective nations.  
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 The challenges faced by NATO, the UN as well as the international community 
prompted the EU to investigate the feasibility of an ESDP mission to support the 
reconstruction of the Afgahn National Police (ANP). “The Council Secretariat first sent 
an exploratory mission to Afghanistan in July 2006, followed by a Joint 
Council/Commission EU Assessment Mission (JEUAM) in September, to assess the 
situation of the Afghan police forces and judiciary.” 73 The PSC then researched the 
mission and the Council of Ministers approved the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) 
and the Concept of Operations (CONOPS).74 Ultimately the Council of Ministers 
approved the mandate for EUPOL Afghanistan and the mission was launched on 17 June 
2007. The Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP set out the following objectives for EUPOL 
Afghanistan, 
EUPOL Afghanistan shall significantly contribute to the establishment 
under  Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing 
arrangements,  which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider 
criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advice and institution-
building work of the Union,  Member States and other international 
actors. Furthermore, the Mission will support the reform process towards a 
trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with the 
international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and 
respect for human rights.75 
 This particular ESDP mission is important for analysis within the scope of the 
three hypotheses because, like Operation Artemis, EUPOL Afghanistan is an out of area 
mission for the EU. However, unlike Artemis this mission is a civilian mission. The 
significance of the civilian mission is two fold. First, the mission involved sending 
civilian law enforcement and legal experts to Afghanistan where the risk of insurgent 
attack was high. Second, the civilian centric style of mission was a different approach at 
improving the effectiveness of the ANP through security sector reforms from that of the  
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United States’ military centric mission.. In other words, the EU was attempting to achieve 
the same objective, aiding security sector reform in Afghanistan, but was using different 
means to achieve it.  
 EUPOL Afghanistan grew out of the interest of the EU as well as the international 
community’s to better integrate the security sector reform efforts in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the EU and the international community recognized that “stability can only 
be achieved by combining security measures with good governance and economic and 
social development.”76 For its part, “the EU identified police reforms as a key dimension 
of the stabilization effort in Afghanistan.”77 
 Analysis of EUPOL Afghanistan, within the context of the first hypothesis, 
presents a number of events that suggest Member States supported this particular ESDP 
mission, because it presented an opportunity to offer an alternative to the U.S. means of 
security sector reform. Therefore, EUPOL Afghanistan offered an opportunity for the EU 
to present itself as an alternative to the United States in Afghan security sector reform 
and thereby balance against the U.S.  
 The EU’s critique of the U.S.-led training of the Afghan National Police was that 
it was too military centric and focused on the wrong spectrum of the Afghan Nation 
Police. Meaning, the U.S. was focusing on creating large quantities of police, thereby, 
focusing primarily on the police themselves and not the trainers.  The EU felt that a more 
civilian centric mission was appropriate; one that focused on training the trainers and 
mentoring the senior officials within the Ministry of Interior, the entity responsible for 
the ANP. “Many EU Member State representatives have doubts about the U.S. military 
strategy in Afghanistan and elsewhere and believe the civilian component of the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is a superior tool for crisis 
management.”78 Furthermore, the EU felt that by creating rapidly trained police in mass 
it blurred the lines between creating soldiers and creating police. Lastly, that the EU, 
unlike the United States, would offer actual police officers and rule of law experts from 
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various Member States. These individuals had greater expertise in law enforcement and 
rule of law than the soldiers offered by the U.S. 
 The Council’s press release regarding the start of the EUPOL Afghanistan 
highlights the macro level approach the EU intended to take in their security sector 
reform efforts in Afghanistan. 
It will work closely with the Afghan police officers, helping them to make 
practical arrangements for security and law enforcement in their areas of 
responsibility, and achieving tangible benefits for the Afghan communities 
protected by these policing arrangements. To this end it will monitor, 
mentor, advise and train at the level of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, 
regions and provinces.79  
The EU is offering an alternative approach to security sector and police reform from a 
macro level. It is also attempting to establish itself within the Afghan Ministry of Interior, 
the Afghan governmental institution responsible for the ANP, so as to help make strategic 
decisions on police reforms. Furthermore, by positioning itself within the Afghan 
Ministry of Interior the EU was enabling itself to exert influence within the Afghan 
government. These actions fall in line with the assumptions of the first hypothesis. While 
there certainly appeared to be supranational motives to the EUPOL Afghanistan mission 
the more compelling motives appear to be national interests of the Member States, 
specifically Germany.  
 Germany had been supporting Afghan police training from 2002 through the 
German Police Project Office (GPPO). “From 2002 to 2007 Berlin provided €12 million 
annually for police building in Afghanistan. On average there were forty police officers 
from Germany’s national and state forces working at GPPO in Kabul and its 
outposts…”80 The relative size of the GPPO mission drew criticism from the United 
States and other NATO members. These NATO members were pressuring Germany for a 
lager commitment. As a result, “the German Foreign Ministry revived its proposal of 
spring 2006: an EU mission to expand and intensify the existing German efforts to 
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rebuild the Afghan police force.”81 An ESDP mission would serve two purposes for 
Germany. First, an ESDP mission would increase the level of commitment to the police 
reform mission by including contributions from other Member States. Furthermore, if the 
EU elected to support the mission additional finances could be made available from 
Brussels. Second, Germany would have the opportunity to lead the ESDP mission in 
support of police reform. “Germany needs the mission to succeed as confirmation of its 
leadership role in civilian EU operations and to counterbalance its ambivalence about 
military deployments. Germany’s contribution to NATO operations in Afghanistan is 
very unpopular domestically.”82  
 The actions by Germany to support, launch, and lead an ESDP mission in 
Afghanistan speaks to their national interests. However, the lack of action by the Member 
States also speaks volumes of their own national interests. Of the larger Member States in 
the EU the UK, Italy and Germany all had Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating in 
Afghanistan. All in all “Member States run 11 Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTS).”83 The PRTs have been military centric in their composition and have fallen 
under control of ISAF with strong ties to their own national governments. This has 
motivated Member States to send most of their resources, they are supplying for 
Afghanistan, through their own respective PRTs rather than through EUPOL 
Afghanistan. This has resulted in manning shortages in the EUPOL mission. The EUPOL 
Afghanistan mission was designed to achieve an end strength of 195 civilian police 
officers. “It was months before the participating states began sending personnel to 
Afghanistan. The size stated in the mandate—195 experts—was not achieved until 26 
February 2009, in other words almost two years after the EU intervention began.”84  
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 In 2008 the PSC increased the number of legal experts required by the mandate to 
400 the Member States still came up short in trying to reach this end state. The fact that 
Member States will support the missions in the Council of Ministers but fail to provide 
the required personnel suggests,   
Member States plainly find it difficult to keep their promises and place 
their own personnel at the service of the mission. Only fifteen of the 
twenty-seven Member States are taking part in EUPOL Afghanistan – and 
of these only Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Italy have managed to contribute more than ten apiece.85  
The chronic shortages have undermined the intent of the EUPOL mission. They have 
resulted in a loss of credibility with Afghan government and with the United States. This 
suggests that Member States would rather lose credibility for the EU, with Afghanistan 
and the United States, than risk their own national political interests in the form of their 
citizens being killed or injured in Afghanistan. This point speaks to the second hypothesis 
as well. It is in the political interests of the Member States to loose credibility for the EU 
rather than allow their citizens to be hurt or killed in support of the ESDP mission. 
 The support for the mission in the Council of Ministers, but lack of action in the 
domestic arena from the Member States speaks to the third hypothesis. In other words, 
there was little political risk in supporting a EU ESDP mission to Afghanistan within the 
Council of Ministers. However, there is political risk within the domestic political arena 
when sending citizens to a war zone. In France the government had been dominated by 
the Union for the Political Movement under President Chirac and President Sarkozy, both 
members of UMP. UMP favors a European means of crisis management that is absent of 
NATO and the United States. Based on the political stance of UMP one would expect to 
see heavy involvement by France in support of EUPOL Afghanistan, however, as of 
December 16, 2008, France had contributed only one police officer to EUPOL. In 
comparison, Germany had sent 31 and the UK had sent 14.86 However, France has 
contributed as many as 3,750 troops as of August 6, 2010, to ISAF. In comparison 
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Germany has sent 4,590 and the UK has sent 9,500 in support of ISAF.87 These statistics 
suggest that France is not operating in line with its leading political party’s stance. In 
other words with a UMP government one would expect to see reservations to NATO and 
U.S. support and greater emphasis on ESDP missions. However, in the case of 
Afghanistan France has sent one police officer in support of EUPOL Afghanistan. This 
would suggest that in France’s case the third hypothesis does not explain France’s 
motivation to support EUPOL Afghanistan.   
 In Germany both parties of the Grand Coalition, the Christian Social Union and 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany, actually share a similar stance on CFSP and 
ESDP. Both parties highlight the importance of civilian strengths offered by the EU in 
mitigating the threats characterized in the ESS. Both parties also agree that the EU should 
be able to act as its own security provider. Germany’s support of the mission and the 
desire to lead the EUPOL Afghanistan mission fall in line with the dominant party views 
at the time. Furthermore, the emphasis of the Germans to push for a civilian mission in 
Afghanistan provides some evidence to support the third hypothesis.  
 In the UK “Conservatives strongly oppose the idea of creating military 
capabilities on the European level. Labourists come out in favor of cooperation in the 
military sphere in the EU in order to cope with tasks that stand in front of the Union.”88 
The timing of the mission and the decisions leading up to the launch of the mission 
suggests that the Labour Party dominated UK decisions within the Council of Ministers. 
Therefore, one would expect to see support of and EU-led mission by the UK. The 
challenge for the UK is also supporting the Atlantic alliance that both parties value. The 
relatively high support for the EU mission, when compared to France, suggests that the 
UK’s support for EUPOL Afghanistan supports the third hypothesis.  
While all three hypotheses are represented in the case study, the most compelling 
argument, for the motives of the Member States to launch this particular mission, are 
captured by the second hypothesis. Support for the supranational motives, the first 
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hypothesis, are drowned out by the lack of actual participation by the Member States. 
Meaning, that while the Member States may have voted to support the mission their lag 
in providing personnel to the mission suggests that the national political interests of the 
Member States, their own citizens, outweigh their supranational aspirations. Furthermore, 
from a political perspective it is easier for political elites at the EU level as well as the 
national level to send soldiers to battle than it is to send civilians. This point speaks to 
why there has been greater national support by Member States for ISAF and their own 
PRTs than to support EUPOL Afghanistan.  
In sum, analysis of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission suggests that the aspirations 
of the Member States during the planning phase were perhaps supranational. The EU 
offered an ESDP mission to address security sector reform in Afghanistan, thereby, 
offering an alternative in crisis management and, therefore, balancing against the United 
States. This supports the first hypothesis, however, the lag in personnel contributions to 
the EUPOL mission suggests that it is easier to support the mission at the Council of 
Ministers than it is to support the mission in actions. Meaning, that the political interests 
of the Member States is in the safety and security of their civilian police officers. 
Furthermore, the dominance of Germany’s national interests being served by 
recommending an ESDP mission in Afghanistan is three fold. First, an ESDP mission 
would offset the financial burden associated with running the GPPO. Second, a civilian 
ESDP mission to Afghanistan would appease the dissatisfaction Germans had with the 
ISAF mission. Finally, a civilian security sector reform and police training ESDP mission 
would provide an opportunity for Germany to take the lead in ESDP and forward the 
German agenda of greater integration in CFSP matters. These points, of German national 
interests, as well as the national political interests of the Member States support the 
second hypothesis. Additionally, the mixed results from analysis of the political party 
stances on ESDP, and support by the Big Three for the EUPOL Afghanistan mission 
suggests that the political party stances had little impact at the Council of Ministers. 




level and not at the EU level. Therefore, in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan the second 
hypothesis offers the most compelling explanation for why the EU engaged in EUPOL 
Afghanistan.  
D. EUNAVFOR SOMALIA: OPERATION ATALANTA  
The final case study offered, in this thesis, is EUNAVFOR Somalia, the EU anti-
piracy mission off the Horn of Africa named Operation Atalanta. This particular ESDP 
mission grew out of the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The lack 
of a functioning government and rule of law institutions has made Somalia a breeding 
grounds for pirates. The instability that resulted when Somalia’s government fell left no 
one to police the waters off the coast of Somalia. As a result the waters were overfished 
and the once legitimate form of work for Somalis was wiped out. Furthermore, the 
instability within Somalia has run out legitimate forms of business, thereby, making 
piracy one of the most lucrative means of work available to Somalis. These unfortunate 
facts resulted in a dramatic increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden from 2006 on. The 
spike in piracy and the costs associated with the threat of piracy and armed robbery 
sparked international attention. As a result, 
The U.N. Security Council issued four resolutions (1816, 1838, 1846, and 
1851) in 2008 to facilitate an international response to piracy off the Horn 
of Africa. At present, Resolution 1851 has authorized international naval 
forces to carry out anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters and 
ashore, with the consent of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG).  
In May of 2008, Spain sent an informational note to the Council of Ministers to 
request the EU look more closely at the threat posed by Somali piracy. Spain cited the 
threat of piracy “affected the legitimate interests of the Member States and other States 
and international players in those waters.”89 Shortly thereafter, Brussels launched a 
number of fact-finding missions to assess the feasibility of an ESDP mission to the Gulf 
of Aden and Indian Ocean in order to mitigate the risk posed by piracy.  On 10 November 
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2008 the Council of Ministers adopted Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, which established 
the mandate for the first ESDP naval mission designed to deter and combat piracy off the 
coast of Somalia.90 This mandate was in support of all UNSC resolution except 1851, 
which authorized anti-piracy operations ashore. The mandate would ultimately establish 
Operation Atalanta, which was tasked with protecting ships supporting the WFP; assist 
with the protection of merchant vessels when possible; “take the necessary measures, 
including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts 
of piracy and armed robbery.”91 The mandate also stipulated that EU forces should arrest 
or detain individuals engaged in or believed to be engaged in piracy and to liaise with 
other entities engaged in anti-piracy operations in the area.  On December 2, 2008, 
Operation Atalanta was officially launched. 
Much like the last two case studies Operation Atalanta provides an out of area 
crisis management mission conducted by the EU under the framework of ESDP to 
analyze within the context of the three hypotheses. From a supranational perspective this 
mission offers several points that support the first hypothesis. First, EUNAVFOR 
Somalia is the first naval operation conducted under the framework of ESDP. This 
mission serves to show that the EU is capable of projecting and sustaining its military 
well outside the borders of Europe. Similar to EUPOL Afghanistan the EU is offering an 
alternative choice in crisis management, in this case it offering an alternative for 
combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Combined Task Force 150, a coalition of the 
willing naval force, had been operating near the Gulf of Aden since the launch of OEF. 
Operation Atalanta provided a means for the EU to operate in an area where the United 
States already had influence. Therefore, by taking on the mission off the coast of 
Somalia, the EU was in a position to balance against the United States influence by 
offering an alternative to the anti-piracy mission. 
Supranational motives can also be found in the timing of the mission. The launch 
of the mission in December 2008 coincided with the end of the NATO mission. Up to 
this time, the task of escorting vessels chartered by the WFP was a mission conducted by 
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NATO. “NATO agreed in short to send the ships of Standing NATO Maritime Group 
Two (SNMG2) to escort these vessels carrying relief supplies to the people of Somali.”92 
After the launch of the EU mission the EU took over responsibility for providing security 
to the WFP ships from NATO. This task was specifically spelled out in the mandate by 
the Council of Ministers. By taking over escort duty of WFP ships, the EU was able to 
isolate U.S. influence from this mission, thereby, making the humanitarian assistance 
mission of WFP a solely EU mission. This action served to present the EU as an 
alternative to NATO, which is heavily dominated by the United States, thereby balancing 
against it. Arguably, escorting WFP ships is not in the interests of the NATO alliance as a 
whole nor what NATO was intended for, however, the fact that the UN asked NATO for 
assistance with WFP as opposed to the EU suggests that the EU was not yet viewed as 
capable of engaging in this type of mission. Therefore, by relieving NATO of the WFP 
escort duties the EU is serving its supranational aspirations and balancing against the 
United States by engaging in the counter piracy ESDP mission. Furthermore, “the move 
toward a strong maritime arm of the ESDP goes beyond the crisis-response capabilities 
outlined in the Helsinki Headline Goal adopted by the European Union in 1999.”93 
While there is evidence that supports the first hypothesis, regarding the EU’s 
motives to launch Operation Atalanta, more compelling is the evidence in support of the 
second hypothesis. The EU’s largest exporter, Germany, sees more that 92 percent of its 
exports to India and China travel through the troubled waters off the coast of Somalia 
annually.94 Furthermore “German ship owners run the world’s third-largest merchant 
fleet and its biggest container fleet. According to the International Maritime Bureau in 
Kuala Lumpur, Germany is the country worst affected by Piracy.”95 In 2007, nearly €84 
billion in goods transited the Gulf of Aden in route from Germany to China. Germany’s 
economic interests were not the only German interests served by supporting Operation 
Atalanta. Germany’s contributions to the EU NAVFOR mission “can be seen as a pro 
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quo for German troop reductions in the Balkans.”96 In other words, Atalanta offered a 
means for Germany to serve its national economic interests as well as serve its political 
interests by removing its forces from the Balkans. Germany was, therefore, motivated to 
support the EU NAVFOR mission, because it supported both its political and economic 
interests. When the mission was in the planning phase in the PSC, Germany was one of 
the first Member States to offer ships in support of an anti-piracy ESDP mission. 
Germany’s actions in the launch of Operation Atalanta support the second hypothesis. 
France also actively contributed and supported the EU NAVFOR mission. 
France’s fishing fleets fish the waters east of the Gulf of Aden, because of the EU fishing 
quotas in the Mediterranean Sea greatly reduce the amount of fish that can be caught 
there. “For countries like France, Italy and Spain where the fishing trade (including in the 
Indian Ocean) plays an important role, piracy has become a threat to national economic 
interests.”97 An ESDP naval mission in the Gulf of Aden also served the political 
interests of France and their desire to play a leading role in ESDP. “French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy sought a leading position for France in the European coalition, with the 
usefulness of France’s strategically important base in Djibouti also speaking for French 
participation.” France’s active contributions for the mission as well as its national 
interests served by the mission support the second hypothesis. 
The UK was initially skeptical of a EU naval anti-piracy mission, likely because 
NATO was already conducting the mission and the UK is not in favor of ESDP 
encroaching on NATO primacy. However, with the NATO anti-piracy mission ending at 
the same time Operation Atalanta was commencing this removed any potential overlap of 
the two missions as well as UK skepticism of the mission. The EU NAVFOR mission 
presented an opportunity for the UK to take the lead on an ESDP mission, which up to 
the start of Operation Atalanta it had not done. By leading Operation Atalanta, the UK 
served its political interests by showing its fellow EU Member States that it was 
committed to ESDP. The active contributions of the UK to the EU NAVFOR mission as 
well as its national interests served by the mission support the second hypothesis.  
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From a national political party stance perspective the German Bundestag was still 
governed by the Grand Coalition of CSU and SPD, much like the EUPOL case study. 
The parties’ stances on ESDP highlight the importance of the civilian capabilities 
associated with ESDP to address the threats listed in the ESS. Furthermore, both parties 
believe the EU should play a greater role in its own security. Based on the political 
stances of these two parties it is not surprising that Germany would actively contribute 
and support an ESDP naval mission off the coast of Somalia. The mission aligns with the 
parties’ stance that the EU should be able to provide for its own security. In this case, the 
naval mission by the EU would be protecting the EU’s economic interests. “Up to 95% of 
EU member states’ trade (by volume) transported by sea…pass[es] through the Gulf of 
Aden.”98 This logic aligns the motives of this mission, in Germany’s case, with the third 
hypothesis. However, what is missing is strong evidence that suggest that this mission 
was selected, because it somehow served the agenda of the CSU and SPD. This same 
point on party stances is true for France as well.  
France, under the leadership of a UMP President, was in support of a EU-led 
naval mission to combat piracy. Furthermore, President Sarkozy pushed for France to 
take a leading role in the mission. This falls in line with the UMP political stance on 
ESDP as well as aligns with the UMP’s de Gaullists roots. However, much like Germany 
there is a lack of evidence that suggests that this mission was selected because it served 
the UMP’s stance on ESDP. It would be fairly difficult to conclude that France supported 
this mission because it served the UMP’s political stance as opposed to serving the 
economic interests of France. 
The UK falls outside what one would expect to see if the stances of national 
political parties dominated ESDP decisions. A Conservative government governed the 
UK when the EU launched Operation Atalanta. Based on the Conservative’s strong 
opposition to creating EU military capabilities the UK should not have supported the 
mission. Moreover, the UK should certainly not have volunteered to lead the mission.  
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Therefore, the UK’s willingness to lead the EUNAVFOR mission as well as its 
contributions to the mission suggest that the third hypothesis does not hold true in the 
UK’s case.  
Operation Atalanta provides an example of a mission that is perhaps less 
polarized by the motives of Member States. In other words, the Operation Atalanta is less 
skewed in favor of the second hypothesis. Put yet another way, all three hypothesis are 
plausible in the case of Operation Atalanta, more so than the other two missions. This is 
likely, because of the tasks laid out for the mission align well with the Petersberg Tasks, 
as well as how closely aligned all of the Member States interests were on this mission.  
The first task spelled out in the mandate from the Council of Ministers for the EU 
NAVFOR mission was to protect the vessels chartered by the WFP. This task aligns the 
mission with the Petersberg Tasks by preventing starvation and human suffering in 
Somalia. Supporting this mission certainly elevates the prestige of the EU as an 
international actor as well as elevates all of the Member States actively contributing to 
the mission. Additionally, the threat posed by piracy to the economies of the EU Member 
States is indiscriminant, therefore, the Member States share in the perspective economic 
losses and disruption of their national economic interests. The Gulf of Aden also 
represents one of the main thoroughfares for European energy. Therefore, piracy is not 
only an economic threat but a strategic threat to the EU as well. More to the point, 
Operation Atalanata serves the institutional legitimacy of ESDP; the national interests of 
the Member States; and is not politically risky for national political parties to support. 
What Operation Atalanta, the 24th EU mission under framework of ESDP, might actually 
represent is the EU’s maturation in launching crisis management missions; mission, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 Analysis of the three case studies suggests there is evidence that supports all three 
hypotheses. In all three cases there was an effort to select a mission that presents the EU 
as an alternative means of crisis management to international actors. Some would argue 
that by being an alternative choice in crisis management an arena generally dominated by 
the United States the EU is balancing. However, in the three cases above the EU was not 
necessarily motivated by balancing as much as it was motivated by offering another 
means of addressing crisis. 
 In the case of Operation Artemis in the DRC it is difficult to support the argument 
that the EU selected this mission, because it was balancing against the United States. If 
this were the case the United States would need to have been engaged in the DRC or at 
least being asked for assistance. However, the UNSG asked the international community 
at large for assistance in the DRC. France was the first to offer assistance; the United 
States had chosen to stay out of the DRC. The EU did not get involved until after France 
had suggested the EU take on the mission under the framework of ESDP. The timing of 
the mission suggests the mission was more about repairing the rift among the Big Three 
on Iraq than about balancing against the United States. ESDP may have been the 
brainchild of the UK and France to balance against the United States in order to have a 
greater voice in European security, but in the case of Operation Artemis there is little 
evidence to support the balancing hypothesis. In the next two case studies is where the 
balancing hypothesis gains merit.  
 In both EUPOL Afghanistan and EU NAVFOR Somalia the balancing argument 
is more plausible. The commonality between these two missions that makes the balancing 
argument more plausible is the presence of the United States. In both mission the United 
States is engaged in the same or similar mission. However, in both cases the EU is 
offering an alternative to the United States. In EUPOL Afghanistan, the EU is offering a 
civilian mission to aid in security sector reforms. This is a different means than the 
military mission offered by the United States to train the ANP. This alternative, offered 
by the EU, provides more plausible evidence to the balancing hypothesis, because the EU 
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is engaged in the same area as the United States and is offering an alternative.  In EU 
NAVFOR Somalia, the EU is again operating in the same area as the United States. It 
offers slightly different tactics than originally used by the United States to mitigate the 
threat of piracy. The EU was the first to establish a website to allow merchant mariners to 
register with EU NAVFOR to join the convoys through the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, 
this website provide information to mariners on resent attacks and their locations. Again, 
in the case of EU NAVFOR Somalia like EUPOL Afghanistan the EU is offering an 
alternative to the United States’ way of addressing a crisis. Therefore, much like EUPOL 
the balancing hypothesis is plausible.  
 While there is plausible support for the first hypothesis in the second two case 
studies the more compelling evidence for EU motives in CSDP mission selection come 
from the second hypothesis. In all three cases the motives for action or lack of action 
center on the national interests of the Member States, specifically the Big Three. 
Operation Artemis was nearly completely dominated by French national interests in 
Africa. Operation EUPOL Afghanistan was nearly completely dominated by Germany’s 
national political interests. Operation Atalanta served the national interests of all three 
countries, as well as, the rest of the Member States. In all three cases the lack of action in 
some cases by Member States also speaks to the national interests of the Big Three.  
 In Operation Artemis Germany played mainly a support role. They provided 
officers for the OHQ and medical evacuation assistance and the UK provided Engineers, 
but neither provided troops. This allowed the UK and Germany to support the mission as 
well as serve their own national political interests by not sending troops. In EUPOL 
Afghanistan, France contributed one civilian police officer and the UK provided 14. Both 
were supporting the EU mission with their contributions, however, both were serving 
their national political interests by the relatively small contributions to the mission. In 
France the OEF mission was very unpopular and, therefore, there was limited support 
domestically. The UK was greatly tied up supporting OEF in Afghanistan as well as 
supporting the war in Iraq. More specifically, the UK was supporting the United States 
and the coalition of the willing in Iraq; supporting NATO in ISAF and OEF, therefore, 
greater support for a EU mission would have been difficult and domestically unpopular. 
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The limited amount of support the EUPOL mission, allowed the UK to support the 
mission and ESDP, while also serving the UK’s national political interests of limited 
additional involvement in Afghanistan.  
 Operation Atalanta allowed Member States to contribute as much as they wanted 
to the mission. The EU budget that was established for the EU NAVFOR mission 
supported the OHQ and the Force Head Quarters (FHQ). The operation of the vessels 
was at the cost of Member States choosing to support the mission. This allowed the 
Member States to make ad hoc commitments to the mission. If popularity for the mission 
was decreasing the Member State did not have to commit its ships for more patrols. This 
loose association to the mission meant there was little political risk for the Member States 
that sent ships to support the mission. 
 In all three cases it is difficult to find evidence that clearly supports the third 
hypothesis. In all three cases there are instances where the Big Three act in line with the 
ruling party or parties. However, there are also cases where the Member States’ actions 
are not in line with the ruling party’s stance on ESDP. This inconsistency and lack of 
evidence that links decisions in the Council of Ministers to political party stances makes 
it difficult to draw a conclusion on the third hypothesis. However, the fact that there is 
inconsistency between the action of the Member States and the political stances of the 
ruling parties towards CSDP suggests there is a two level political game being played by 
political elites in the EU. More to the point, political elites have to cater to their 
constituents in domestic politics, while they also have to cater to their fellow Member 
States at the EU level. This then incentivizes political elites to engage in a two level 
game. The game could be played to support the domestic interests of the Member State in 
the EU or garner support domestically for a CSDP missions. In either case the evidence 
supports the likelihood of a two level game being played by political elites more than 
political parties motivating CSDP mission selection. In the Council of Ministers the 
political elites are offered the opportunity to support its national interests. In domestic 
politics political elites are offered the opportunity to garner support for a CSDP mission. 
Furthermore, as political parties are concerned the more likely explanation is that the 
ruling parties define the national interests.   
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 The dominance of national interests in CSDP mission selection is the result of a 
lack of integration in the CFSP realm. So long as the EU operates as an 
intergovernmental organization in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy they 
are likely to continue engaging in ad hoc crisis management missions. This also suggest 
that as long as missions are dominated by national interests in tough economic times 
there is likely to be a decrease in support for new out of area CSDP missions. If austerity 
measures dominate the interests of the Member States finding money to launch new 
ESDP missions may be hard to come by. Moreover, new CSDP missions may be hard to 
budget for when trying to pay off national debt. One potential solution for the EU is to 
generate a White Paper or some other binding document that establishes a strategy and 
list of commitments by the Member States for CSDP missions. In order for this to work 
however, greater integration in the area of CFSP is required and will require Member 
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